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What Kind of Civil Society?  
The changing complexion of public engagement at the WTO 
Erin Hannah, Amy Janzwood, James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson 
 
Abstract 
Since the WTO’s creation its relationship with civil society has changed significantly. In 
this article, we use an original dataset to: (i) plot the changes that have taken place in civil 
society group representation at the WTO Public Forum; and (ii) assess the significance of 
these changes for understandings of public interactions with the WTO. We test four 
hypotheses drawn from prevalent claims made in the academic and policy-facing 
literatures: (i) that the volume of participation in the Public Forum is determined by the 
ebb and flow of WTO-centered trade politics, with participation levels peaking during 
moments of crisis and falling away during times of stasis; (ii) that the stalling of the 
multilateral trade agenda has led to business interests turning away from the WTO; (iii) 
that the participation of NGOs in the Public Forum is also sensitive to the rhythms of trade 
politics; and (iv) that governments – particularly those from the global North – have begun 
to lose interest in the WTO and shifted attention to other arenas. We find support for 
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hypotheses one and three but not for two and four. We subsequently analyze whose voices 
are heard at the Public Forum and find that there has been a narrowing of the arena of 
trade debate over time.
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Introduction 
Civil society interest in trade has a long history,1 though it increased noticeably following 
the establishment in 1995 of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In its most spectacular 
form this interest has been expressed in the demonstrations that took place during WTO 
ministerial conferences in the late 1990s and early 2000s – most notably in Geneva 
(1998), Seattle (1999), Cancún (2003), and Hong Kong (2005) – but it has also taken the 
form of myriad internet campaigns, articles, newspaper columns, briefings, statements, 
civil education exercises, workshops, town hall meetings and many others.2  
 In 2001, in response to the strength of civil society interest in trade, the WTO 
secretariat created the Public Symposium to provide a formal mechanism for engaging 
non-state interests. The Symposium was subsequently renamed the Public Forum in 2005. 
Yet, for all the importance it has come to assume in orientating WTO-civil society 
engagement, the Public Forum has not been the subject of a dedicated study nor have 
attendance levels therein been scrutinized. References to the Public Forum and – less 
frequently – its attendees are present in the literature, but these are few and far between, 
and no systematic study exists. That said, multiple claims are made in the academic and 
policy-facing literatures about the character and composition of civil society and its 
engagement with the multilateral trading system. These claims warrant further 
investigation because they shape understandings of not just WTO-civil society 
engagement but also wider trends in trade politics, and they have not been scrutinized in 
the context of the WTO Public Forum.  
                                                        
1 Steve Charnovitz & John Wickham, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Original International 
Trade Regime, 29 J. World Trade 111-122 (1995). 
2 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, The Internet and the Seattle WTO Protests, 13 J. Soc. Just. 331-337 (2001); Ann 
Capling & Kim Richard Nossal, Death of Distance or Tyranny of Distance? The Internet, 
Deterritorialization, and the Anti-Globalization Movement in Australia, 14 Pacific Rev. 443-465 (2001); 
and Mario Pianta, Slowing Trade: Global Activism Against Liberalization, 5 Global Policy 214-221 (2014). 
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We examine patterns of attendance at, and participation in, the Public Forum – the 
central venue for civil society participation in multilateral trade-related debates.  Our aims 
are: (i) to understand better how interest in, and the character of, debate about multilateral 
trade has evolved over time; (ii) to reflect on the accuracy of existing wisdom in the field; 
and (iii) to address what we find to be errors and omissions in the literature. 
In pursuit of these aims, we present and analyze new data on WTO Public Forums 
to understand better the complexion of civil society groups at the WTO Public Forum; the 
extent of civil society’s interest in the multilateral trade agenda; and the effect of political 
developments in trade negotiations on patterns of WTO-civil society engagement.  We do 
this by plotting the changes that have taken place in civil society group representation at 
the Public Forum and by testing four hypotheses about the changes that have taken place 
in the complexion of civil society actors represented at, and absent from, the event.   
These hypotheses are:  
(i) that the volume of participation in the Public Forum is determined by 
the ebb and flow of WTO-centered trade politics, with participation 
levels peaking during moments crisis and falling away during times of 
stasis;3  
(ii) that the stalling of the multilateral trade agenda has led to business 
interests turning away from the WTO;4  
                                                        
3 Martina Piewitt, Participatory Governance in the WTO: How Inclusive is Global Civil Society, 44 J.World  
Trade 467-488 (2010); and Marcel Hanegraaff, Jan Beyers, & Caelesta Braun, Open the Door to More of the  
Same? The Development of Interest Group Representation at the WTO, 10 World Trade Rev. 447-472  
(2011). 
4 Cornelia Woll, Global Companies as Agenda Setters in the World Trade Organization, in The Handbook  
of Global Companies (John Mikler ed., John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2013); Jappe Eckhardt, The Decreasing  
Interest of Business in the WTO: Why Should We Care and How Can We Solve it? (ICTSD & World Trade 
Institute 2013); and Dirk De Bièvre, Arlo Poletti, Marcel Hanegraaff, & Jan Beyers, International 
Institutions and Interest Mobilization: The WTO and Lobbying in EU and US Trade Policy, 50 J. World 
Trade 289-312 (2016). 
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(iii) that the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
Public Forum is also sensitive to the rhythms of trade politics; and 
(iv) that governments – particularly those from the global North – have 
begun to lose interest in the WTO and shifted their attention to other 
venues.  
In examining the data, we find evidence to suggest that the volume of participation 
in the Public Forum generally – and NGO participation in particular – is indeed sensitive 
to the ebb and flow of trade politics, with participation levels peaking during moments of 
crisis and falling away during times of stasis (hypotheses one and three). However, we 
find little support for claims that business groups are losing interest in the multilateral 
trading system or that governments have also turned their attention away from the WTO, 
as reflected in their attendance levels at the Public Forum (hypotheses two and four).  
Indeed, we find evidence to suggest that there is some variance between claims made that 
business and government interest is dwindling, and actual rates of participation in Public 
Forums. 
In examining the data we also identify trends in the geographical distribution of 
participants. We do this to help give further insight into the character and complexion of 
civil society representation at the Public Forum. In so doing, we find that Northern based 
business groups are becoming increasingly prominent within the Public Forum, and also 
that the primary voices heard in Forum debate (that is, the panelists) are also increasingly 
from institutions of the global North. This points to a significant change in complexion of 
the civil society groups represented at the WTO, which may underpin a change in the 
character of debate and of civil society-WTO engagement. 
In pursuit of our aims, the paper unfolds as follows. We begin with an overview of 
the development of the Public Forum since its creation, describing how it is structured and 
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organized. We then review the literature on non-state actor engagement with the WTO and 
extract the four hypotheses outlined above. Thereafter we set out how we gathered and 
analyzed our data, and present our findings. We chart the changes that have taken place in 
the character of attendees and presenters exploring the changing proportion of participants 
drawn from our six main analytical groups – states, NGOs, academia, business, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and labour – and how they have evolved over the 
Public Forum’s lifetime. We illustrate the changes that have taken place in the geographic 
origins of delegates and identify other key trends in the data; and we offer explanations for 
these changes over time. We then explore the changes that have taken place in the 
geographic origins of delegates and presenters. In the final section we reflect on the 
literature and offer our concluding comments. 
 
Why Study the Public Forum?  
Scholarly curiosity in civil society’s engagement with trade issues has been high since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Key works have 
explored the existing and future role of non-state actors in the multilateral trading system; 
the potential of global civil society to act as a democratizing and a transformative force; 
civil society’s capacity to give voice to otherwise unheard demands and interests; the role 
of non-state actors in opening the multilateral trading system up to greater participation, 
accountability, and transparency – and official rebuttals thereof; and the function of NGOs 
in dispute settlement.5  
                                                        
5 Erin Hannah, NGOs and Global Trade: Non-State Voice in EU Trade Policymaking (Routledge 2016); 
Silke Trommer, Transformations in Trade Politics: Participatory Trade Politics in West Africa (Routledge  
2014); Kristen Hopewell, Multilateral Trade Governance as Social Field: Global Civil Society and the  
WTO, 22 Rev. Intl. Pol. Econ. 1128-1158 (2015); Robert O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart 
Scholte, and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global 
Social Movements (Cambridge University Press 2000); Baogang He and Hannah Murphy, Global Social 
Justice at the WTO? The Role of NGOs in Constructing Global Social Contracts 83 Intl. Affairs 707-727 
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 Yet, despite the scale of this curiosity, there are a number of areas that remain 
relatively unexplored. Little work, for example, has been done on understanding precisely 
who makes up the civil society that engages with the WTO. Scholars have noted clear 
differences in the aims and orientations of civil society groups and categorized them 
accordingly,6 but few systematic studies have been done. Similarly, with the exception of 
Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Braun’s study7 of the participation of interest groups across seven 
WTO ministerial conferences, little has been done to track changes in the composition of 
this civil society over time. Likewise, although participant observation has underpinned 
pronouncements in the literature about the degree to which civil society interest in trade 
has oscillated in accordance with progress in the most recent round of trade negotiations – 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), or Doha round8 – little empirical support has been 
offered by way of verification. Equally, almost no disaggregation has been pursued to 
determine how different civil society groups (e.g., labour, NGOs, business associations) 
have adjusted their engagement with trade issues in the wake of the (now set aside) Doha 
round. Moreover, little systematic data currently exist on the broad geographic affiliation 
of civil society groups. 
 In large measure, these gaps and oversights in the extant literature are a 
consequence of the difficulty of obtaining data on civil society’s composition and the 
trends therein. Good desk-based work has been done exploring the kinds of civil society 
campaigns that have been pursued and the range of interests involved, and targeted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(2007); Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion 1 J. of Intl. Econ. Law123-147 (1998). 
6 Jens Steffek, Awkward Partners: NGOs and Social Movements at the WTO, in The Oxford Handbook on 
the World Trade Organization (Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton, and Robert M. Stern, eds., Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
7 Hanegraaff et al., supra n. 3, at 447-472. 
8 James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, What happened to Doha in Geneva? Re-engineering the WTO’s image 
while Missing Key Opportunities 22 European J. of Dev. Research 141-153 (2010). 
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interview programs have made important interventions.9 However, more directed studies 
examining discrete instances of engagement between civil society and the WTO have 
proven more problematic. Studying the complexion of civil society demonstrations during 
ministerial conferences, for instance, requires too great a degree of happenstance, in terms 
of being in the right place at the right time as well as being able to survey participants.10 
Moreover, it tells us very little about the character of civil society beyond those 
demonstrating outside of the official conference centers in which ministerial conferences 
are hosted. Likewise, focusing on particular issue-based campaigns – such as pursuing a 
waiver to the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights to enable genetic 
pharmaceutical production in times of health emergencies – is similarly fraught selection-
wise because it involves too narrow a range of interests.11 
 Understanding the broad character of the civil society engaged with trade issues 
and the WTO is thus not best achieved by exploring discrete instances of civil society-
WTO engagement, albeit that valuable insight may lie therein. Rather, a systematic 
examination of civil society participation during both ministerial conferences and the 
organization’s Public Forum can go some way to filling that gap – though neither is 
without its own challenges. Some good work has been conducted on civil society and its 
engagement with the WTO during ministerial conferences, most notably by Hanegraaff, 
Beyers, and Braun12 – but elsewhere scholarly comment has tended to be confined to 
                                                        
9 Nigel Haworth & Stephen Hughes, Trade and International Labour Standards: Issues and Debates Over a 
Social Clause, 39 J. Industrial Relations 179-195 (1997); Hannah Murphy, The Making of International 
Trade Policy: NGOs, Agenda-setting and the WTO (Edward Elgar Pub. 2010); and Alina Rocha Menocal, 
What Happened at the WTO Summit in Cancún? A Conversation with Adrian Lovett of Oxfam GB, 14 Dev. 
in Practice 423-427 (2004). 
10 Margaret Levi and Gillian Murphy’s work on event coalition building during the 1999 Seattle  
demonstrations is a notable exception in this regard. See Margaret Levi & Gillian H. Murphy, Coalitions of  
Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle, 54 Pol. Stud. 651-670 (2006). 
11 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wisconsin Intl. Law J. 481-521 (2001); 
Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political Economy of AIDS Treatment: Intellectual Property and the 
Transformation of Generic Supply, 51 Intl. Stud. Q. 559-581 (2007); and James Scott & Sophie Harman, 
Beyond TRIPS: Why the WTO’s Doha Round is Unhealthy, 34 Third World Q. 1361-1376 (2013). 
12 Hanegraaff et al., supra n. 3, at 447-472. 
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passing mentions in studies that have otherwise focused on the negotiating substance and 
dynamics of those events rather than specifically targeted studies.13 
 Examining the dynamics of civil society-WTO engagement is more 
straightforward at the Public Forum, as attendance is open to any member of the public. 
As we show below, overall levels of attendance have remained reasonably robust. Access 
is available through a simple process of registration, and the WTO building – the Centre 
William Rappard – houses the event in its entirety, enabling a better sense of the character 
of civil society in attendance to be ascertained through direct participation by the 
researcher and set alongside data on numbers and participants. Data on who has registered 
to attend Public Forums are not publicly available, but have been provided to us by the 
WTO secretariat. There are constraints on what can be concluded from the data – for 
instance, for privacy reasons the WTO is unable to provide data on the numbers of 
delegates that actually attend the events. Also, it should be noted that those with WTO 
badges do not have to register to attend the Public Forum.14 
Given the absence of systematic data on civil society participation and 
methodological problems associated with gathering such data, our choice of the Public 
Forum to understand dynamics between civil society actors is clear. However, these are 
not the only motivations for our study. Theoretically, the interaction of these actors also 
tells us something about the extent to which engagement with multilateral economic 
institutions such as the WTO remains a preference for civil society actors in a way that it 
did in the late 1990s and early 2000s.15 And secondly, while governments remain the 
                                                        
13 Faizel Ismail & Brendan Vickers, Mandela’s Way: Reflections on South Africa’s Role in the Multilateral 
Trading System, in Trade, Poverty, Development: Getting Beyond the WTO’s Doha Deadlock (Rorden 
Wilkinson & James Scott eds., Routledge 2013). 
14 WTO badges can be held by members, observers, observer organizations, journalists and local NGOs.  
15 Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, & Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: 
Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge U. Press 2000); Jan Aart 
Scholte, A More Inclusive Global Governance? The IMF and Civil Society in Africa, 18 Global Governance 
185-206 (2012). 
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central negotiating parties at the WTO, focusing on civil society interaction helps us better 
understand whose voices are being heard in – or at the very least who is engaging with – 
the WTO in the only dedicated, officially sanctioned non-state venue.  
 
The WTO Public Forum 
The Public Forum is the primary outcome of a public engagement strategy led by the 
WTO Secretariat that has its roots in the groundswell of civil society interest in trade 
issues that accompanied the organization’s establishment. It was perhaps inevitable that 
the inclusion of references to sustainable development and the environment in the 
Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement and the lack of a resolution to the long-standing 
question of worker rights and multilateral trade regulation would spur civil society interest 
in the multilateral trading system from the very outset.16 A year after the WTO’s creation, 
member states recognized the need for guidance on how relations with civil society should 
be structured. Members envisaged minimal interaction between the institution itself and 
public groups, preferring civil society to direct its attention towards national governments 
rather than the WTO itself. The result was an agreement by member states in the WTO 
General Council of a set of ‘Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-
Governmental Organizations’, which set out the ‘broadly held view’ that NGOs would not 
have any direct involvement in the work of the WTO or its meetings.17 Instead, what these 
guidelines did was to highlight the importance of consultations at the national level as the 
appropriate avenue through which to deal with civil society concerns as this is where 
primary responsibility lies ‘for taking into account the different elements of public interest 
which are brought to bear on trade policy-making’.18 
                                                        
16 David Robertson, Civil Society and the WTO, 23 The World Econ. 1119-1134 (2000). 
17 WTO, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations,  
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm (accessed 27 July 2017). 
18 WTO, supra n. 18. 
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This strategy, however, proved insufficient, and its shortcomings were brought 
sharply into focus during the mass demonstrations accompanying the organization’s 1999 
Seattle ministerial conference.19 The so-called “Battle of Seattle” underscored the need for 
a more controlled arena in which civil society could engage with the WTO. The creation 
of the annual Public Symposium – and subsequently the Public Forum – was a key 
element of that response.20 The Public Symposium was not, however, intended to be a 
radical departure from existing ways of dealing with civil society interests or the 1996 
guidelines. Rather, it was seen as the extension of an existing mode of engagement using 
symposia as fairly neutral and useful consultation exercises that had already been put in 
place. This was, as Gabrielle Marceau and Peter Pedersen put it, ‘largely due to the 
success of the first symposium [on trade and environment, held in June 1994 in the run up 
to the formal establishment of the WTO] and the fact that Members found it to be a useful, 
if arms-length, exercise in NGO-WTO relations, with the Secretariat serving as ‘buffer’ 
between Members and NGOs’.21  
With this in mind – in the wake of the 1999 Seattle ministerial conference and in 
the run-up to the November 2001 Doha ministerial meeting (at which the DDA was 
launched) – the first Public Symposium was held in July 2001. From the outset, civil 
society – private individuals and representatives of non-state, not-for-profit groups 
including NGOs, labour, academics, business associations, and consumer organizations – 
participated alongside a host of other actors including for-profit business, delegates from 
IGOs and state-based representatives such as those working in permanent missions to the 
                                                        
19 Hannah, supra n. 6. 
20 Erin Hannah, James Scott & Rorden Wilkinson, Reforming WTO-Civil Society Relations early view 
World Trade Review (2017). 
21 Gabrielle Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent? A Discussion of  
the Relationship of the WTO with Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society’s Claims for More  
Transparency and Public Participation, 33 J. of World Trade 5-49 (1999). 
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WTO creating a unique gathering of disparate interests within global economic 
governance.  
The primary purpose of the Public Forum according to the WTO is to provide an 
opportunity for civil society actors to participate in dialogue about timely issues (WTO 
2017).22 For civil society actors, it is an opportunity to keep abreast of developments in 
multilateral trade politics as well as more generally trade and related issues. As noted 
above, the WTO guidelines on relations with civil society stipulated that it was at the 
national level that civil society should direct its pressure, leaving the WTO as a purely 
government-to-government forum; the extent to which such national level consultation is 
possible depends on the domestic constitutional order of the member in question. The 
Public Forum tacitly serves to circumvent some of these constraints by providing a 
measure of direct access for civil society groups, allowing, if nothing else, their voice to 
be heard. In this sense, it built on the pressure from civil society to have direct access to 
the WTO’s dispute settlement process. One year prior to Seattle, the WTO’s Appellate 
Body received unsolicited briefs by three NGOs in the 1998 Shrimp–Turtle case. After a 
legal conflict within the Dispute Settlement Understanding about the legality of these 
submissions, the Appellate Body began to accept amicus curiae briefs, or submissions by 
civil society.23 
The submission of amicus curiae briefs is highly important as a means of civil 
society having a voice within the WTO when relevant cases arise, but the Public Forum 
serves as the primary regular platform for conveying issues of concern and it provides 
regular networking opportunities, particularly for those with limited resources. Unlike 
ministerial conferences where civil society actors are invited to submit position papers, 
                                                        
22 WTO, Public Forum, https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm  
(accessed 27 January 2017). 
23  Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the ‘Public Interest’: The Legality and Rationale of Amicus Curiae 
Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes, 12 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 85-113 (2011).  
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there is no direct mechanism at the public forums to provide feedback to the WTO on 
substantive trade policy matters.24 As Martina Piewitt suggests, the Public Forum is a 
‘platform for information exchange rather than access to decision-making processes’.25  
Each Public Forum is organized around a central theme chosen by the secretariat 
(see Box 1). Civil society organizations, as well as business, IGO and state-based 
representatives are invited to submit panel proposals consisting of: a topic, a description of 
how it addresses the core thematic questions, and a set of speakers. The secretariat then 
selects panels based on fit with the theme, the quality of the speakers, and the diversity of 
viewpoints across the panel.26 The list of proposed panels is not publicly available, 
making it impossible to assess with pinpoint accuracy which panels are filtered out. The 
obvious concern expressed by some observers is that panels that are critical of the WTO 
are rejected, but the perennial inclusion of at least some critical voices (such as Our World 
is Not For Sale, which holds a series of panels each year) demonstrates that there is no 
obvious exclusion of those that are more critically opposed to trade orthodoxy. The 
secretariat also organizes keynote speakers for plenary sessions that occur during each 
morning of the Forum, and provides translations into the WTO’s three official languages 
for as many panels as possible.  
 
Box 1—WTO Public Symposium/Forum Themes  
 
2001—Symposium on issues confronting the world trade system 
2002—The Doha Development Agenda and beyond 
2003—Challenges Ahead on the road to Cancún 
2004—Multilateralism at a crossroads  
2005—WTO after 10 years: Global problems and multilateral solutions 
2006—What WTO for the XXIst century?  
2007—How the WTO can help harness globalization? 
                                                        
24 While the WTO secretariat reported on the forum until 2012, it no longer does so. 
25 Piewitt, supra n. 3, at 467-488. 
26 Anonymous interview with WTO secretariat official 3 October 2014. 
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2008—Trading into the future 
2009—Global problems, global solutions: Towards better global governance  
2010—The forces shaping world trade 
2011—Seeking answers to global trade challenges 
2012—Is multilateralism in crisis? 
2013—Expanding trade through innovation and the digital economy 
2014—Why trade matters to everyone  
2015—Trade Works! 
2016—Inclusive Trade 
 
 
What the Literature Says 
The existing literature comprises a series of pointers that help guide what we might expect 
to find when observing participation in the Public Forum over time. We gather these 
pointers together to formulate four hypotheses that we then use to explore the data.  
First, almost all of the literature on multilateral trade politics since the Public 
Forum was created is couched within developments in the Doha round. Here 
commentators note how moments of contention and contestation in the round have been 
accompanied by heightened interest – public and otherwise – in trade and the WTO.27  
Similarly, moments of abeyance, stagnation, and stalemate see public interest in the round 
falling off, with commentators noting particular disengagement by business and developed 
country interests in the round.28 
 What we should see, then, are claims that participation in the Public Forum 
oscillates broadly in line with developments in the round. As moments of crisis are 
integral components of WTO processes and play a role in the patter of negotiations, we 
should be able to plot patterns of participation in the Public Forum accordingly. Moreover, 
given the character of WTO negotiations – in which the most politically difficult decisions 
are often pushed to intensive, time-bound negotiations during ministerial conferences and 
                                                        
27 Rorden Wilkinson, What’s Wrong with the WTO and How to Fix It (Polity, 2014); Rorden Wilkinson, 
Language, Power and Multilateral Trade Negotiations 16 Review of International Political Economy 597-
619 (2009).  
28 Hopewell, supra n. 5, at 1128-1158. 
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mini-ministerial meetings, and bluff and political posturing serve to manufacture moments 
of crisis, which then create the space for forward movement – we should expect spikes of 
interest in, and engagement with, the WTO Public Forum to accompany key political 
moments in the trade negotiations as civil society groups seek to use the venue to leverage 
their voice.  
Second, a consensus exists in the literature that suggests one of the problems that 
the DDA encountered was a lack of interest from the business world.29 With most of the 
new issues that business groups have increasingly demanded being absent from the Doha 
agenda combined with the glacial pace (and ultimate failure) of the negotiations, claims 
have been made that business has moved on to push for mega-regional trade agreements 
rather than pursue liberalization and new rule making in the WTO.30 What we should 
expect to see, then, is a loss of business interest in the trade agenda as the Doha 
negotiations stall and a measure of disengagement from WTO matters including 
withdrawal from the Public Forum. 
Third, claims of disengagement from the WTO have not been confined to business 
groups. Scholars have argued that the global civil society movement that brought the 
multilateral trade system to public attention in Seattle in 1999 has subsequently morphed 
into an ‘alter-globalization’ movement and a project of global democratization31 that has 
turned the movement’s attention toward other areas – the war in Iraq, anti-G-7/G-8/G-20 
protests, climate negotiations, the Occupy movement, and mega-regional trade 
negotiations. When taken together with claims that civil society interest in the multilateral 
                                                        
29 Roberston, supra n. 17, at 1119-1134; and Eckhardt, supra n. 4. 
30 See, for example, Woll, supra n. 4. 
31 Ruth Reitan, Theorizing and Engaging the Global Movement: From Anti-Globalization to Global  
Democratization, 9 Globalizations 323-335 (2012). 
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trade agenda has diminished since the 2008 impasse in the DDA we should expect to find 
falling levels of NGO engagement in the Public Forum.32 
Fourth, the trade literature suggests that governments, particularly those of the 
global North, have lost interest in the WTO after becoming disenchanted with its lack of 
ability to secure new trade agreements, and turned their attention to the mega-regional 
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP)33 as well as other initiatives as the fortunes of mega-
regionals themselves have waned. Trade officials have long talked of the WTO and the 
DDA being outdated, whether it be Pascal Lamy (when EU trade negotiator) deriding its 
‘medieval’ structure34 or US Trade Representative Michael Froman asserting that ‘Doha 
was designed in a different era, for a different era’.35 Unable to secure an agreement to 
their liking, industrialized country members have sought to utilize other forums for 
pushing forward the trade agenda.36 This suggests that a disenchantment with both the 
WTO and the Doha round should lead to disengagement by governments in the 
multilateral trade agenda which would have an obvious impact on participation at the 
Public Forum. Indeed, if Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Braun are correct and there are ‘usually 
just a few governmental representatives present’,37 we should find less participation by 
government delegates – particularly from the global North – at the Public Forum. 
What we have, then, are four hypotheses that offer suggestions about what we 
ought to expect to find when we examine data on civil society participation at the Public 
Forum: (i) that the volume of participation in the Public Forum is determined by the ebb 
                                                        
32 Piewitt, supra n. 3, at 467-488. 
33 Ferdi de Ville & Gabriel Siles-Brügge, TTIP: The Truth About the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (Polity Press 2015). 
34 ICTSD, Bridges Daily Update #6: Cancún Collapse: Where There’s No Will There’s No Way,  
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/bridges-daily-update-6-cancun-collapse-where-theres-no-   
will-theres-no-way (accessed 28 July 2017). 
35 Michael Froman, We Are at the End of the Line on the Doha Round of Trade Talks, Financial Times,  
https://www.ft.com/content/4ccf5356-9eaa-11e5-8ce1-f6219b685d74 (accessed 28 July 2017). 
36 Christina L. Davis, Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy, 7 Perspectives on Pol. 25-31 (2009). 
37 Hanegraaff et al., supra n. 3, at 451. 
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and flow of WTO-centered trade politics, with participation levels peaking during 
moments crisis and falling away during times of stasis; (ii) that the stalling of the 
multilateral trade agenda has led to business interests turning away from the WTO; (iii) 
that the participation of NGOs in the Public Forum is also sensitive to the rhythms of trade 
politics; and (iv) that governments – particularly those from the global North – have begun 
to lose interest in the WTO and shifted attention to other arenas. 
 
Methodology and Data  
Our observations are drawn from four sources: (i) a dataset comprising all participants 
registered at WTO Public Forums since 2002 made available in a raw form by the WTO 
Secretariat for use in this research; (ii) a dataset on the composition of all panels at the 
Public Forum since 2001, again compiled and analyzed by us and made available by the 
WTO Secretariat; (iii) extensive participant observations of Public Forums since 2010 as 
attendees; and (iv) a more general set of semi-structured interviews with civil society 
groups, secretariat staff and WTO member delegates conducted since 2003 that take in 
aspects of the composition of civil society and its evolving relationship with the WTO. 
Taken together, these sources provide comprehensive insight into the changing dynamics 
of the WTO Public Forum, of formalized engagement between non-state actors and the 
multilateral trade agenda, of the character of the civil society engaged in the Public 
Forum, and of the trends in participation therein. We describe the development and 
analysis of our two novel datasets below.  
 First, using total population sampling, we gathered information on participant 
registrations from twelve Public Forums from 2002 to 2014 and all presenters from those 
events.38 The dataset was compiled using registrant data collected and provided to us by 
                                                        
38 The Public Forum themes and dates can be found in Appendix I.   
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the WTO secretariat on each annual Public Forum and from publicly available Public 
Forum programs.39 This compilation is novel as these data have not been previously 
assembled or analyzed.    
 The datasets include the organizational and country affiliations of each registrant 
and panelist at the Public Forums. The total entries for analysis numbered 19,754 (17,035 
registrant and 2,719 panelist entries). From 2002 to 2005 the WTO organized the data 
according to organization and country. In 2006 a new category was introduced for the self-
selected position of the registrant. The mainstays included ‘academic’, ‘NGO 
representative’, ‘government official’, ‘business representative’, but there were also 
several other less commonly used categories which changed from year to year (such as, 
journalist, lawyer and student). Our method of categorization differs from that used in the 
WTO’s annual reports, and we have created eight actor categories, which we believe more 
accurately captures the range of actors present at the Public Forums. Each organizational 
entry was coded as ‘academic’, ‘business’, ‘IGO’, ‘labour’, ‘NGO’, ‘state’, ‘individual’, 
or ‘miscellaneous’. Notably ‘academics’ included high school and graduate students, and 
those who self-identified as academics. The ‘business’ code was primarily used to identify 
representatives of non-profit business associations (including farming industry 
associations) and for-profit corporations, but also includes small numbers of consultants, 
consumer advocates, and lawyers. At the level of our analysis, it is not necessary to 
disaggregate these categories although doing so will be advantageous for future research.  
 Identifying ‘IGOs’ was straightforward, based on the character of the 
organizational affiliation specified. The ‘labour’ code was used to identify representatives 
of organized labour unions. Private, non-profit groups with advocacy agendas (based on 
their mission statements and web content) organized at the local, national or international 
                                                        
39 The Public Forum Programmes are available online at 
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm. 
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level were coded as ‘NGOs’. Entities coded as ‘state’ included government officials, 
parliamentarians, or those who self-identified as affiliates of local authorities. Each 
organization is also coded as either global North or global South. This was determined 
through a combination of Human Development Index (HDI) rankings and geography.40 
International organizations with universal membership were coded as zero, neither from 
the North or the South.  
 A subset of organizations was difficult to categorize with confidence because of 
the hybrid nature of their governance, wherein their structure and/or behavior were unlike 
other actors in their respective category, and therefore were categorized as 
‘miscellaneous’. Representatives from various news and media outlets were also coded 
‘miscellaneous’ because they could not be attributed to one of the actor categories. 
Otherwise, some organizations have since become defunct or could not be located – most 
prevalent in NGOs from the global South. It is also notable that some individuals 
registered to attend the Public Forum without an institutional affiliation and therefore were 
coded ‘individual’.  
 The data were analyzed for aggregate and longitudinal descriptive tabulations. The 
purpose of this analysis is to understand better: (i) how civil society participation has 
changed at the Public Forums relative to other actors; and (ii) how the dynamics between 
civil society organizations and other actors in the global North and global South have 
changed at the Public Forum. Our results are discussed in the following sections. 
 
                                                        
40 Although an HDI of 0.8 or more is generally considered to represent ‘highly developed’ countries, 
Argentina, Cuba, Chile (of the countries represented in the public forums) are recipients of the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) as of 2014 and were categorized as global South. Five additional countries 
(Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Brunei Darussalam) were above the 0.8 
threshold located in the Middle East and Asia (receiving GSP as of 2011) were likewise classified as global 
South. 
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Our Findings 
Figure 1 shows the overall number of registrants each year. From the introduction of the 
Public Forum the number of participants increased rapidly to just over 1,700 in 2005. The 
peak years of 2005 and 2007 coincided with the most intense period in the DDA 
negotiations, which fits with claims that there is a correlation between attendance at the 
Public Forum and the intensity of negotiations within the WTO. These peaks stand out 
among what is otherwise a fairly stable participation rate that shows modest fluctuation 
around an average of approximately 1,400 registrants each year.  
 
Figure 1: Public Forum Participants, 2002-2014 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 separates out the categories of participants and shows changes in their 
levels of participation. The data show a number of trends that warrant further 
investigation. First, rather than demonstrating a gradual fall in the degree of business 
participation in the Public Forum, a more complex picture is evident. It can be seen that 
claims that business interest in the DDA has weakened and led to a disengagement from 
the WTO do not hold. While business interest peaks in the year 2007 before declining 
when the DDA was put on ice in 2008, that decline was relatively small and short-lived. 
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Beginning in 2009, representation from business groups has risen again to re-attain its 
previous peak.  
 Second, NGO participation peaks around the time of the most intense period of 
DDA negotiations (2005-2007) but then enters a period of much steeper and sustained 
decline, with what might be seen as the beginnings of a reversal of that trend visible only 
in 2014. This is what we might expect to find on the basis of claims that NGOs are 
moving on to new campaigns and disengaging from the WTO process as the DDA was put 
on hold.  The upturn from 2014 needs to be understood better when additional data are 
available.  
 Third, the data also suggest that there is little support for the claim that 
governments have disengaged from the multilateral trade agenda following impasses in 
WTO negotiations. Though there are clear peaks in interest in 2005 and 2007 
corresponding with crisis points in the DDA negotiations around the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference and the peak point of the negotiations around the mini-ministerial 
processes in 2007, rather than a decline we see a fairly steady overall rise in state 
participation in the Public Forum. For example, state representative attendance in 2011 
was relatively high. 
 Fourth, the data show a relatively large and quite volatile ‘academic’ group. In 
large measure this size and volatility is driven by the inclusion of large numbers of high 
school students in particular years (such as 2013). Since then, the secretariat has sought to 
limit the participation of students who are below university level, feeling that high school 
students are unable to follow the discussions sufficiently well.41   
 Fifth, the data show that the other groups make up only marginal elements of the 
total number of participants at these events. Notably, labour groups are almost absent in 
                                                        
41 Interview with WTO Secretariat staff, Geneva, Switzerland, 3 October 2014. 
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most years. The peak in labour representation in 2005 corresponds with the final flurry in 
the trade-labour standards debate that was prominent during the early years of the Doha 
round and which was subsequently settled in the WTO moving on instead to regional fora 
among other venues.42 
 
Figure 2: Participants by Category, 2002-2014 
 
                                                        
42 Nigel Haworth, Stephen Hughes, & Rorden Wilkinson, The International Labour Standards Regime: A 
Case Study in Global Regulation, 37 Enviro. & Plan. A 1939-1953 (2005). 
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 The different trends in the absolute numbers of participants across the categories 
have resulted in changing proportions between them. Figure 3 plots the percentage of total 
participants represented by each group, along with trend lines. Some aspects are 
noteworthy and point to the character of the Public Forum changing over time. As noted 
above, representatives of labour have diminished (albeit from a low starting point) 
declining from around five per cent of participants in the first few years of the Public 
Forum to just one per cent in more recent years. This is despite the subject of some Public 
Forums being seemingly of direct relevance to labour. The 2014 Public Forum, for 
example, included as one of its three sub-themes ‘trade and jobs’.43 Despite this there is 
clearly little direct engagement between labour groups and the WTO, and certainly much 
less than when labour issues were at the forefront of civil society debate.44 Numbers of 
academics and students have risen substantially over time, though declined in recent years 
                                                        
43 WTO, Public Forum 2014 Theme, https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum14_e/theme_e.pdf 
(accessed 1 August 2017). 
44 Steve Hughes & Rorden Wilkinson, Labour Standards and Global Governance: Examining the 
Dimensions of Institutional Engagement, 6 Global Governance 259-277 (2000). 
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for the reasons set out above. Interestingly, the Public Forum has seen the overall 
proportion of NGO participants decline, despite the origins of the Public Forum residing 
in an attempt to engage precisely this area of civil society. By contrast, business 
participants make up an increasing proportion of registered attendees and have become the 
largest group in most recent years. Likewise, there is an overall downward trajectory in 
the percentage of state-based representatives, though this is primarily a result of 
particularly high totals in the first two years. When these two figures are controlled for, 
there no overall trend is discernible.  
 
Figure 3: Proportions and Trend Lines for Categories of Public Forum Participants 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Trend lines are least squares regression lines 
 
 What the data do show is a correlation between heightened moments of political 
contestation in the DDA and increased levels of civil society participation across all 
groups. It would have been a great surprise if this were not the case. However, the data 
also show that other common claims in the literature are substantiated. For instance, there 
is no evidence that business groups have disengaged from the WTO as measured by their 
participation in Public Forums both as panelists and registrants. In actuality, business 
interest in WTO proceedings, as measured in this way, has risen over time. Equally, there 
is no evidence of support for the claim that states have come to see the WTO as less 
important, or that few government officials attend the Public Forum, despite the protracted 
problems of the DDA. This is not to say that states have not looked elsewhere in terms of 
negotiating trade deals with the so-called mega-regionals being an obvious focus of much 
negotiation activity, but beyond that the evidence we present here suggests that this has 
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not been accompanied by a wholesale diminution in the importance of the WTO as a site 
for trade governance.  
 While these data provide insights into general attendance rates of the evolution of 
civil society as a broad group they can also hide important inequalities and discontinuities 
within each group. In the next section we disaggregate the data into global North and 
South in the pursuit of greater insight, since this is the primary political division within 
WTO politics.45 
 
Disaggregating by global North and South 
Figure 4 gives the proportion of total Public Forum participants coming from the global 
North and South. It provides greater nuance to the patterns presented in Figure 1, showing 
markedly different trends between Northern and Southern registrants that are obscured in 
the aggregate data. It must be remembered when interpreting this data that, as set out in 
the methodology section above, it is the geographical distribution between global North 
and South of organizational affiliations not individuals – that is, each participant is 
attributed a Northern or a Southern code based on the organization rather than on an 
individual’s nationality – for which data are unavailable.  
 Participants representing organizations from the global North have remained 
relatively stable over time, showing no clear trend from 2004 onwards after the initial 
growth of the Public Forum as a whole. Organizations from the global South show two 
trends (though with substantial year-on-year variation), increasing to a peak in 2007 
before declining subsequently. As such, it is specifically the organizations from the global 
South that fit most accurately with the claim in the literature that levels of participation 
track political developments in the negotiations; whereas, attendance by those from the 
                                                        
45 Kristen Hopewell, Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project (Stanford 
U. Press 2016). 
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North appears to correlate less with the ebb and flow of WTO politics. This is supported 
further by Figure 5, which gives the proportions of total participants between North and 
South. It shows that participation by those representing Southern based organizations 
increased as a percentage of the total until the DDA entered its period of crisis, before 
declining slightly. 
 
Figure 4: Public Forum Participants by Global North and South 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Proportions of Public Forum Participants by Global North and South 
 
 Figure 6 offers further disaggregation by splitting the categories of participants 
into global North and South as a percentage of total participants. Here we see greater 
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between global North and South. The South provides a majority of state representatives, 
perhaps reflecting the use that Geneva based trade missions make of the Public Forum as 
an opportunity to network with one another and to engage with debates about trade 
matters. Given that many developing country delegates in Geneva cover multiple 
organizations, events like the Public Forum provide times in which they focus attention on 
the WTO. Businesses from the global South increased dramatically until almost reaching a 
par with those of the North in 2008, before the gap re-emerged. This alters the picture 
provided in the aggregate data above. While we can see that business groups are emerging 
as the largest group within the Public Forums, this growth is coming primarily from the 
global North.  
 For NGOs we also see important caveats when we disaggregate for geographic 
region. What we find is that interest from NGOs based in the global South expressed in 
rates of registration at the Public Forum increased until 2008 before falling back; whereas, 
NGOs from the global North showed a steep decline in registered attendance in the early 
years before leveling out. We can see then that the decline post-2007-2008 in the 
proportion of participants coming from the developing world – that is seen in Figure 8 
above – can be attributed primarily to the relative reduction of NGO registrations from the 
global South over this time.  
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Figure 6: Percentage of Total Participants at the Public Forum Disaggregated by 
Category and Global North and South 
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 Bringing this together, participation in the Public Forum generally shows two 
phases – from 2002 to 2007 when the DDA was actively being negotiated, and then from 
2008 onwards when a new period emerged. Overall numbers of participants at the Public 
Forums increased quickly in the first period and peaked at moments of particular political 
tension within the DDA, with registered attendance falling back thereafter to a position of 
remaining fairly flat.  
 In that second period the Public Forum has taken on a more Northern tinge, 
reversing the trend in the first period. Business groups have become more prominent over 
time and in the second period this has been driven by an increasing interest from business 
participants from the global North. The global South saw a significant increase in 
participation rates for business groups until 2007 with this trend being reversed in the 
second period. This is also mirrored in participation rates for NGOs, in which parity 
between North and South was achieved around 2007-8 before the re-emergence of a 
significant gap between the two. Labour groups were always relatively marginal and have 
become all but absent. State-based representatives have remained relatively steady over 
time and the global South now provides a majority of this group. As noted above, the 
continued strong participation by the global South in this category possibly reflects the 
fact that they make of the Public Forums as both a networking and learning opportunity – 
a chance to hear a range of voices and opinions about the global trade system. This poses 
the question: whose voices are being heard? It is to this issue that the next section turns. 
 
The Content of Public Forum Panels as an Indicator of ‘Voice’ 
Participation is only one aspect of the character of the Public Forums. Equally important is 
the composition of the panels since it is panelists that, in large measure, shape the content 
of debate. It is the views of panelists that are communicated to the other participants and 
 31 
which are – by dint of their role as speakers – deemed expert and authoritative. Figure 7 
shows the total number of Public Forum panelists, which provides a measure of the 
evolution in the size of the event. It is clear that the Public Forum has expanded 
considerably, with rapid growth in the early years before a more steady overall expansion 
from 2004. It is notable that the size of the event measured in this way does not follow the 
same pattern as the number of participants examined above. Though there are small 
variations over time, there is no obvious diminution in the number of panels in periods of 
negotiation stasis. Indeed, the Public Forum is clearly growing over time on this measure. 
 
Figure 7: Number of Panellists at Public Forums 2001-2014 
 
 Figure 8 disaggregates this overall picture into the seven categories. A number of 
trends are visible but interestingly they differ significantly across categories. Again in 
contradistinction to conventional wisdom, the number of panelists representing business 
has risen fairly continuously, suggesting no disengagement from official WTO processes. 
By contrast, the number of NGO panelists has waxed and waned over time, rising to a 
peak in 2006 before falling significantly and then rising strongly again from 2011. The 
most dramatic trend is the steady rise of representatives of IGOs, which by 2014 formed 
the joint largest group. 
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Figure 8: Number of Panellists by Category, 2001-2014 
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 Figure 9 converts these into the proportions that each category represents each 
year. A number of trends are noteworthy. The proportion of panelists from business has 
increased significantly (albeit in a rather volatile fashion) since 2007, often now forming 
the largest group in recent years. The fall in the proportion of NGO representatives 
registering to attend the Public Forums seen in Figure 3 above is largely mirrored here, 
though with some reversal of that trend in recent years. Nonetheless, from a position of 
being comfortably the largest category of panelists in the early years of the forums NGOs 
are now roughly on a par with state and business groups. Consistent with the data 
presented earlier in the paper, labour as a group is marginal, particularly in the post-2005 
period. 
 
Figure 9: Proportions of Panellists by Category 
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 As before, it is important to disaggregate by geographical region. Figure 10 shows 
the proportion of panelists from the global South from 2001 to 2014. What we see is 
considerable year-on-year variation around an average of approximately thirty per cent of 
panelists, though with a concerning, albeit slight, downward trend over time. 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of Panellists from the Global South 
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 Figure 11 offers further elaboration, disaggregating by category. A number of 
things are noteworthy. The proportion of panelists taken from NGOs has declined in both 
North and South, but shows a larger fall from the North. While business is the only group 
in which there is a clear (though small) upward trend in panelists from the global South, 
the lion’s share of the overall rise in the number of business representatives that was seen 
in Figure 9 is found to be from the global North. State representatives are the only group 
for which the global South forms a majority in most years, though this may now be 
narrowing.  
 
Figure 11: Panellists by Category and by Global North and South 
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 The overall picture that emerges is that there have been notable changes over time 
in the character of the voices being heard on the panels of the Public Forums. The early 
dominance of NGOs has declined, particularly those of the global North, which has seen 
business and IGOs take on a greater proportion. The debate is led predominately by voices 
from the global North and this has remained stable over time. In the next section we 
discuss why the findings of the previous two sections are of interest and what they suggest 
for the study of non-state actors and the multilateral trading system more generally. 
 
Conclusion  
Our purposes in this paper have been three-fold. First, we have sought to offer the first 
empirically rigorous assessment of the changing character of civil society at the WTO 
Public Forum since its inception. Second, we have sought to test four hypotheses drawn 
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from the literature on the complexion of the global civil society: (i) that the volume of 
participation in the Public Forum is determined by the ebb and flow of WTO-centered 
trade politics, with participation levels peaking during moments crisis and falling away 
during times of stasis; (ii) that the stalling of the multilateral trade agenda has led to 
business interests turning away from the WTO; (iii) that the participation of NGOs in the 
Public Forum is also sensitive to the rhythms of trade politics; and (iv) that governments – 
particularly those from the global North – have begun to lose interest in the WTO and 
shifted attention to other arenas. We find that the data supports hypotheses one and three, 
but we find little support for two and four. In fact, there has been little disengagement 
from either the business community or governments, despite the difficulties in the WTO 
negotiations. 
Third, through providing disaggregated data concerning who is attending WTO 
Public Forums and who sits on the panels we have been able to identify some trends and 
insights that would otherwise remain hidden. Some of the implications of these are 
explored in the following concluding remarks.  
 Broadly in line with much of the literature on global civil society and the WTO, 
our findings suggest that the critical character of global civil society has been blunted over 
time by its interaction with the WTO.46 By taking the changing complexion of participants 
as a proxy measure, there are three points worthy of emphasis. First, while the Public 
Forum was introduced by the WTO Secretariat to engage with NGOs, it is business actors 
that are increasingly being engaged at the Public Forum. This trend is true both in terms of 
business sector participation more generally and in terms of invitations to partake as 
                                                        
46 Hopewell, supra n. 5, at 1128-1158; Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power in the World Trade  
Organization (Oxford U. Press 2013); Bill Paterson, Transformismo at the WTO, in Gramsci and Global  
Politics: Hegemony and Resistance (Mark McNally & John Schwarzmatel eds., Routledge 2009); Michael  
Strange, Writing Global Trade Governance: Discourse and the WTO (Routledge 2013); and Karen Tucker,  
Participation and Subjectification in Global Governance: NGOs, Acceptable Subjectivities and the WTO, 42  
Millenium: J. Intl. Stud. 376-396 (2014). 
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panelists at the Forum. We also find evidence that while the prevalence of these actors has 
increased at the Public Forum, the participation rate of NGOs has decreased, again both as 
participants and panelists. As NGOs tend to be more critical of the WTO than other civil 
society actors (particularly business groups), this suggests that the space for critical civil 
society voices may be increasingly being crowded out. The increase in prevalence of IGOs 
on Public Forum panels can also be interpreted as evidence of this trend as IGOs – often 
representing multiple actors and governing multiple issue areas – also tend to hold less 
critical views of trade issues than advocacy-based NGOs. What is clear is that the Public 
Forum is not a space for contestation or critical dialogue. Rather, it is a venue for 
information sharing among relatively likeminded groups. However, it is unclear what the 
drivers of these changes are.47 Future research could interrogate the relationship between 
the changing make-up of participants and panelists, as well as understand the drivers of 
the changes in the relationship between the civil society actors at the Public Forum more 
broadly. One tentative hypothesis is that these changes have been driven, at least in part 
and perhaps unwittingly, by the WTO secretariat as the increase in business participation 
and decrease in NGO participation at the Public Forum was preceded by an increase in 
business participation and decrease in NGO participation on Public Forum panels.  
 Second, there is a persistent gap in participation between civil society actors from 
the global North and South. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in NGO participants 
from the global South after 2007-8. While the location of venue (Geneva) provides some 
insight – previous research has suggested venue choice matters in terms of regional civil 
society participation at the ministerial conferences48 – this does not explain variation 
among groups of civil society actors or across time. A more complete explanation might 
draw on both structural factors, such as asymmetrical resource distribution between 
                                                        
47 Hannah, Scott & Wilkinson, supra n. 21. 
48 Piewitt, supra n. 3, at 477. 
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countries and the institutional power of particular countries within the WTO, and 
proximate factors, namely the patter of negotiations.   
 Finally, the changed composition of participants at the Public Forum begs the 
question of whether its purpose has changed substantially since its conception. Piewitt 
suggests that the Public Forums provide an important source of knowledge for civil 
society actors, which enables them to participate more effectively on the sidelines of 
ministerial conferences.49 The continued presence of participants from state groups in the 
global South reinforces this argument, suggesting that the Public Forum is a learning and 
networking opportunity. However, the concern is that the Public Forum is no longer a 
place to contest effectively the elements of the global trade system, or to generate 
innovative thinking about how to remedy its deficiencies, particularly as they relate to 
areas like the distribution of welfare gains, or the relationship between trade and human 
health, food security, or sustainable development. Given the ever-increasing recognition of 
the tensions between trade and these issues, it maybe necessary to rethink the role of the 
Public Forum as an institutionalized venue for debate.  
                                                        
49 Piewitt, supra n. 3, at 483-4. 
 
